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Abstract: This study tests through an experiment the hypothesis that heavy emphasis on conflicts in 
the news undermines political trust and has an impact on citizens’ cynicism and political participation. 
Findings do not support a uniform negative impact of the conflicts covered in the news but demonstrate 
a cumulative effect of their levels of intrusiveness and incivility. In addition, we found consistent 
evidence that personal characteristics influence people’s reactions to conflicts. For extrovert individuals, 
who are typically more assertive in public matters, have higher levels of political knowledge and feel 
more politically efficacious, exposure to conflict frames does not necessarily result in lower political 
trust. 
Keywords: Conflict Frames; Political Trust; Issue Obtrusiveness; Civility; Extroversion, Political 
Knowledge; Political Efficacy 
 
1. Introduction2 
Media coverage of politics in Romania is increasingly conflict-oriented, reflecting 
the growing internal political turmoil. Politics in Romania over the past years have 
been marked by domestic conflict and allegations of abuse of power. Romanian 
politicians have been widely accused of power abuses and ignoring the nation’s 
needs while focusing on their conflicts with each other.3 The internal political 
                                                 
1 National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, 30 Expozitiei Street, 012103, 
Bucharest, Romania. Contact e-mail for all three authors: madalina.botan@comunicare.ro. 
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for his/her careful reading of our manuscript and many 
insightful comments and suggestions. 
3 There are numerous international organisations which issue annual reports on media coverage of 
politics in Romania (for instance The Foreign Policy Research Institute, http://www.fpri.org/rese
arch/eurasia/ democracy-watch/romania/), freedom of speech in the media or the abuses of the 
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conflicts and the way they have been framed by the Romanian media have been 
reported by various journalistic institutions and international NGOs.4  
Building on this, we test through an experiment whether the exposure to 
such high levels of political conflict covered in the news necessarily leads to public 
mistrust and apathy towards political participation or if there are other variables, 
which can help us understand how the political controversies are linked to the 
public's representations of political leaders and institutions.  
In addition, we wanted to add a more fine-grained understanding of the 
impact of the political conflicts routinely covered by the media; therefore we have 
tested two variables which have not been previously analysed in direct relation to 
the impact of journalistic coverage of politics on political trust:5 issue 
obtrusiveness and the valence of political conflicts over contentious issues (civil 
vs. uncivil debates and controversies). We have anticipated that these two 
variables might influence the way people react to political disputes. Thus we have 
included measures of ‘issue obtrusiveness’ and ‘civility of debate’ in our 
experimental conditions in order to find an accurate scale for measuring the 
effects of political conflicts, as framed in the news. The main goal of this study 
has been to provide a theoretical understanding of news frames revolving around 
political conflicts and to advance an experimental design that could potentially 
isolate their differential impacts on political trust. 
Lastly, we believe that personality traits can help researchers understand the 
differential effects that media have on individuals. In our experiment, we have 
tested a set of personality characteristics, such as introversion - which have been 
tested in correlation with public behaviour of social interaction but never in 
relationship with political trust – and political knowledge and efficacy: traditionally 
linked to political participation (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Mutz 2002; Avery 
2009) in order to better disentangle their impact on how people process and use 
information. Testing for psychological and personality characteristics is still very 
new in the field of media effects research. However, we consider that this is a very 
fertile research ground which will receive increasing scholarly attention in the near 
future. Our findings are modest, but indicate a very rich and diverse palette of 
cognitive and emotional reactions towards political information. 
The trend of increasing coverage of political conflicts in the Romanian media 
deserves to be better scrutinised, especially since in other European countries an 
opposing trend seems to be prevalent. Various authors have noticed a decline of 
conflict-oriented news in Germany and in the Northern countries, such as the 
                                                                                                                                 
political elite and institutions over the media (Transparency International or Freedom House, to cite the 
most notable).  
4 For example in the Transparency International Corruption Index; see TI (2015). 
5 Some authors (Brooks and Geer 2007; Kahn and Kenny 1999; Mutz 2002) have already argued 
for the necessity to find a scale for the debates and political controversies; Civility and 
obtrusiveness haven't been, however, tested as stand-alone categories in relation to political trust. 
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Netherlands and Denmark, where the presence of political conflicts in the news 
peaked in the 1990s or the early 2000s, and has dramatically declined ever since 
(Takens et.al. 2013; Zeh and Hopmann 2013). News focused on conflicts between 
journalists and politicians or on conflicts among politicians seem to be 
a distinctive trait of newscasts in certain countries, such as Spain and France, 
while in other European countries (the Northern countries and Germany, for 
example) there are very few political conflicts and controversies covered in the 
media (Maurer and Pfetsch 2014). Trying to understand if the predominance of 
political conflicts in the news is a country characteristic and a metaphor for the 
local political culture, we have started by having a closer look at journalistic 
practices and the prevalent frames used when covering politics. Our main goal – 
as previously stated – was to identify if the particularities of covering politics in 
the media influence the overall political trust as well as to see if there is a 
differential impact of the political conflicts prioritised by the media and if certain 
people (based on their personality characteristics) respond differently when 
exposed to political conflicts, such as when they are commonly filtered and 
framed by the journalistic practices.6  
Framing of information in the news was demonstrated to consistently affect 
the direction of public opinion (Chong and Druckman 2007; Druckman 2001; 
Iyengar and Kinder 1987/2010; Schuck and de Vreese 2006; Sniderman and 
Theriault 2004). A news frame points out ‘the essence of an issue’ and suggests 
‘what the controversy is about’ (Gamson and Modigliani 1987: 143). When 
citizens are repeatedly exposed to a certain frame, they internalize it and use it to 
understand the issue at hand (Entman 1993). 
The fact that one of the most common frames within contemporary political 
journalism revolves around conflict has consistent consequences on citizens’ 
political support (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Iyengar 1991; Schuck and de 
Vreese 2012). Conflict frames are organized around disagreements over issues of 
public interest or political clashes and manoeuvres (Gross and Brewer 2007) and 
are traditionally more unsubstantiated than frames that focus on the stakes of the 
discussed matters (Bennett 2006).  
From a journalistic perspective, issues that involve conflicts or disputes are 
generally considered newsworthy, and therefore they are more likely to get media 
attention (Tuchman 1978). Beyond newsworthiness, conflict-driven information is 
more appealing to the public, and thus it has even more chances to be picked up 
by the media (Graber 2010). In the process of covering political conflicts or 
disputes, journalists should normally try to seek a balance between competing 
positions. However, journalists are rarely neutral transmitters of information; 
                                                 
6 We have replicated some of most prevalent journalistic frames in the Romanian media in our 
experimental stimuli, as identified in our previous research (Corbu and Botan 2011; Cristea and 
Corbu, 2014). 
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therefore, even if presumably unintended, the use of conflict frames is ‘politically 
charged in practice’ (Gross and Brewer 2007: 130). In other words, journalists 
suggest particular themes and interpretations by which conflicts tend to be 
understood through their choice of conflict framing. Another problem with this 
approach to covering politics is that the substantial issues under debate are often 
relegated to the periphery.  
Existing research dedicated to political conflict looks almost exclusively at the 
impact on voter turnout (Brooks and Geer 2007; Kahn and Kenny 1999; Mutz 
2002; Min 2004). Correlated to this, heavy emphasis on conflict also seems to be 
responsible for the erosion of public trust in politicians and political institutions 
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995), as well as for citizens’ cynicism and 
disengagement with politics (Avery 2009; Cappella and Jamieson 1997). Even if 
the majority of the empirical research dedicated to media effects was undertaken 
in the United States, recent European research dedicated to this topic also 
validates the correlation between negative media coverage of politics and 
institutional mistrust (Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012). An interesting finding from 
such cross-national research is that education seems to be a key characteristic 
influencing political trust, but with a different valence depending on the country: 
while in Eastern-European countries the greatest political mistrust is exhibited by 
the most educated, in various Western countries, the less educated have less trust 
in the government and political institutions (Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012). 
A possible explanation might again be related to local journalistic practices. 
Eastern European media is more focused on political conflict and disparity, 
therefore citizens who have higher incomes are more media savvy and politically 
knowledgeable, understand in more substantial ways what the controversies are 
about and, consequently, become more sceptical towards politics in general, in 
comparison with their poor, less educated compatriots, who do not understand 
the stakes of the political games of power and manoeuvres and are, therefore, 
more insensitive to the political information covered in the media. In Western 
countries, where the media coverage of politics seems to be more consensus 
oriented and less prone to underlining the disparities among various political 
entities, the better educated seem to understand the necessity of opposing 
positions as part of a healthy, democratic debate, while the lower-income, less 
educated citizens are more prone to distrusting politicians and political 
institutions, misinterpreting the debates as signs of an inefficient political system. 
 
2. Conflict frames and their differential impact on political trust: 
a moderated relation 
Coming back to the local context in Romania, we wanted to test if the relevance 
of conflicts between politicians over contentious issues in Romanian media can 
alter citizens’ trust in political institutions and political parties, both reunited in an 
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index of ‘political trust’. Scholars have only recently begun to examine the 
possibility that different conflicts portrayed in the media may affect citizens’ 
political attitudes and behaviours in different ways. There is consistent evidence 
that people distinguish between useful negative information presented in an 
appropriate manner and irrelevant or harsh mudslinging (Kahn and Kenny 1999). 
It is difficult to find encompassing taxonomies and typologies of political 
conflicts. Some authors consider the ‘harshness’ of the tone a reliable criterion 
(Kahn and Kenny 1999); others have suggested the ‘fairness’ versus ‘unfairness’ of 
attacks, or the evaluation of the employed argument or idea (Jamieson 1992). 
Different concepts are deployed in these studies, usually for measuring the same 
features, and the majority of authors, with few exceptions (Geer 2006), do not 
make a clear distinction between ‘conflicts’, ‘attacks’, ‘contrast’ or ‘negativity’. We 
argue that such distinctions are crucial in understanding the differential role 
conflict plays in shaping political trust. Conflicts portrayed in the news vary 
according to their civility and debated topics, and audience members presumably 
respond to this variation. However, no research has tested this hypothesis in order 
to examine if and how different types of conflicts play a role in shaping political 
support. 
In this study, we explore the obtrusiveness of the political topics and the civil 
vs. uncivil way in which such topics are debated in the news, in an effort to 
identify the differential impact of the conflicts portrayed in the news on political 
trust. We argue that political conflicts have different identifiable effects on the 
audience’s level of political trust depending on how they are framed in the news. 
We maintain that the civility of the political conflicts presented in the news and 
their level of obtrusiveness influence political trust amongst media audiences. In trying 
to draw boundaries between particular aspects of conflicts between politicians 
over contentious issues we differentiate between: A) conflict style, which pits civil 
conflicts (legitimate remarks expressed in an appropriate manner) against uncivil 
conflicts (accusatory remarks presented in a strident and pejorative manner); and 
B) conflict topic, which covers obtrusive conflicts (focused on issues of personal 
relevance, important to audience members) and unobtrusive conflicts (focused on 
aspects of low-relevance for a certain audience). This taxonomy of political 
conflicts – as portrayed in the media – has allowed us to isolate the differential 
impact each of these conflict dimensions has on political trust.  
In this context, we wanted to further explore what some of the individual 
factors susceptible to moderating the impact of conflict frames on political trust 
were. In this attempt we have tested three variables: political knowledge, political 
efficacy and introversion. 
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a. Moderation variables for media effects on political trust 
Negative information seems to command more attention, and attacks are 
considered to have the highest level of negativity, mainly because attacks tend to 
be personal, and more unfair than substantive criticism (Geer 2006: 64). Other 
scholars (Geer 2006; Kahn and Kenny 1999; Min 2004) have distinguished 
between campaign ads that focus on personal traits versus those that focus on 
policies. Even though they have reached different conclusions, such authors seem 
to agree that personal attacks are less relevant to political life and have more 
potentially detrimental effects than policy attacks. Using the policy versus 
personality dichotomy, some authors have contended that the former is more 
effective since it is perceived as more legitimate (Gross and Brewer 2007).  
Conflict frames are likely to decrease political trust because they emphasize 
the disagreements between political parties and, in a broader way, underline the 
perceived inefficiency of political institutions (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). 
Since a focus on conflict in the political news is not likely to consolidate the image 
of a cohesive and efficient political institution, we expect conflict frames to have 
a strong negative effect on political trust. Therefore, we expect that: 
 
 H1: Conflict frames have a negative impact on political trust. 
 
Furthermore, we argue that the differences go beyond the distinction 
between personal and issue-based attacks, and that the manner in which conflicts 
are presented can make a substantial difference in how political conflicts are 
understood by the audience. There is consistent evidence that dishonest, 
unprincipled criticism makes citizens uncomfortable with the presented 
information (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995), and therefore leads to increased 
cynicism and lower political interest (Cappella and Jamieson 1997).  
In addition, political conflicts portrayed in the news are likely to decrease 
political trust because they emphasize the disagreements between political parties 
and, in a broader way, underline the perceived inefficiency of political institutions 
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). Since a focus on conflict in the political news is 
not likely to consolidate the image of a cohesive and efficient political institution, 
it is not counter-intuitive to expect conflict frames to have a strong negative effect 
on political trust. 
The public’s cognitive and affective reactions depend also on the topic of the 
news stories, therefore the conflict topic and, implicitly, its capacity to engage the 
public, is crucial when trying to evaluate the impact of conflict-driven 
information. Obtrusive topics might be more likely to draw attention and to 
trigger a reaction than unobtrusive topics. An issue is obtrusive if the public has 
direct experience with it, or unobtrusive if the public has no direct contact with it. 
Domestic economic issues such as inflation and unemployment are often cited as 
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examples of obtrusive issues, whereas foreign affairs are considered to be an 
unobtrusive issue. Framing effects are presumably stronger for unobtrusive issues, 
because individuals rely more on media information about those topics. 
 
Combining both conflict style and topic, we hypothesize that: 
 
H2: Conflicts presented in an uncivil manner about obtrusive topics will depress 
political trust to a larger extent than conflicts phrased in a civil manner about 
unobtrusive topics.  
 
3. Individual characteristics moderate the impact of the frames 
present in the news 
Recently, more fine-grained distinctions among the effects of news frames have 
moved away from content features toward variations of personal characteristics, 
since individuals are not homogenous in their knowledge of or motivation to 
think about an issue, and, therefore, they are not ‘equally receptive or responsive 
to the same messages’ (Chong and Druckman 2007: 7).  
As shown by past research, news frames resonate with pre-existing political 
knowledge and reinforce partisan attitudes (Valentino et al. 2011). Identifying 
prior knowledge is thus an important step in exploring the impact of conflict 
framing on political trust. Extensive literature indicates that people filter media 
messages through their own political views – if any – (Zaller 1992); as a result, 
political knowledge together with other individual characteristics shape how 
citizens respond to news frames (Iyengar 1991). Existing knowledge is a key 
variable, especially since individuals, when trying to make a judgment about 
certain issues, rely the most on their prior knowledge regardless of the nature of 
the analysed issue (Nelson et al. 1997). When audience members are exposed to 
new information for which they do not have a knowledge base, they are more 
likely to be influenced by news frames, since they do not have an existing opinion 
on the presented matter. In line with these arguments, we assume that when 
citizens have greater political knowledge, conflict framing will not necessarily 
result in lower political support. In contrast, less knowledgeable individuals will be 
more stongly influenced by conflict-oriented political news.  
Next, the second moderating variable we have tested is extroversion, a trait 
associated with assertiveness and enthusiasm, which has been positively correlated 
to political participation (Gerber et al. 2011). Conflict-driven information seems 
to trigger different reactions depending on people’s general reluctance to publicly 
express their opinions. Recent research suggests that people with high levels of 
extroversion are more likely to become politically involved (ibid.). Since there 
seems to be a significant positive relationship between extroversion and various 
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forms of political participation (ibid.; Vecchione and Caprara 2009), we believe 
that extroverted individuals, who are typically more assertive to public matters, 
will not be negatively influenced by conflict frames to the same extent as 
introverted individuals.   
The political impact of extroversion has been studied in conjunction with 
another classical moderator: political efficacy – our third moderating variable. In 
fact, there is consistent proof that the link between extroversion and participation 
goes through political efficacy (Gallego and Oberski 2012; Vecchione and Caprara 
2009).  
Political efficacy refers to the feeling that one’s participation can actually 
make a difference and that elected politicians serve the public interest (Delli 
Carpini 2000: 396). As demonstrated by previous research, exposure to negative 
or cynical portrayals of politics reduces citizens’ sense of efficacy (Ansolobahere 
et al. 1999; Valentino et al. 2011). However, this seems to be less the case with 
individuals high in political efficacy, because they feel they understand how to take 
part in politics, and are not intimidated by the challenges, conflicts or 
disagreements that occur in that arena (Valentino et al. 2011: 308). Along this line, 
we expect conflict frames to have a differential impact on individuals according to 
their political efficacy. For less politically efficacious individuals, the negative 
impact of conflict frames might be higher, while for politically efficacious 
individuals it might have a more modest effect.  
Building on such findings, we argue that the main variables which moderate 
the effect of conflict frames are prior political knowledge, political efficacy and 
extroversion. In order to test this assumption, we have formulated the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H3. Political knowledge, political efficacy and extroversion will influence the level of 
political trust, based on the type of conflict frame people are exposed to. 
 
Specifically, we expect political efficacy to influence the level of trust in 
politics and politicians in general; at the same time, we expect political trust to be 
higher for extroverted than for introverted people, but we also believe there are 
differences in intensity and even in the level of significance of the correlations 
between variables, based on the type of conflict frame in the news item a person 
reads. To better understand their influence, we build two regression models 
predicting variations in political trust (dependent variable), based on the type of 
conflict exposure (uncivil obtrusive vs. civil unobtrusive conflicts).  
In summary, we maintain that political trust fluctuates as a consequence of 
exposure to conflict-driven information (H1). We expect conflict frames to 
negatively impact political trust especially when they are formulated in an uncivil 
manner around obtrusive topics (H2). In the second part of this paper, we 
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advance the prediction that conflict-driven information has a differential effect on 
political trust depending on the political knowledge, political efficacy and 
extroversion level of the audience members (H3). 
 
4. Method 
a. Participants and Design 
The experimental design allowed for the testing of hypotheses regarding the 
impact of the conflict frames. In order to test the combined effect of civil vs. 
uncivil and obtrusive vs. unobtrusive types of frames, we built a 2x3 experiment, 
plus a control group. There is constant proof among researchers that student-
based sampling is a fairly good sampling choice, with a higher potential for 
generalizing results (Nelson et al. 1997). However, the high homogeneity of the 
sample raises problems of representativeness, and does not offer much variation 
in socio-demographics. We will address these limitations in the discussion section. 
A sample of 2nd and 3rd year undergraduate students (N=617) was used in the 
experimental design. The sample was composed of 517 women (83.8%) and 
100 men (16.2%), aged between 19 and 25 years old. In terms of political 
preference, more than 50% (53.8%) did not mention a political preference (don’t 
know/no answer or undecided or would not vote). Six hundred and seventeen 
undergraduate students in a medium size university in Romania were randomly 
assigned to the 7 stimulus conditions: Obtrusive and unobtrusive topics treated in 
a civil or uncivil manner, a non-conflict (neutral) presentation of both obtrusive 
and unobtrusive topics, and finally a control group which was not exposed to any 
kind of stimulus.7 
Before participating in the experiment, students signed a consent form 
informing them that they would each read a newspaper article and fill out 
a questionnaire asking how they feel about the article and about politics in general. 
For the selected population (students), the obtrusive topic was related to an 
increase in tuition fees, while the unobtrusive topic focused on agricultural 
subsidies granted by the Government. The experiment was conducted in 
November 2012 during the election campaign in Romania, a period of time in 
which the level of interest in news in general, and particularly in political news, 
was presumably higher than in non-election periods.  
 
                                                 
7 The treatment message combinations were as follows: 90 subjects in the control group, 87 for 
the ‘obtrusive civil’ condition, 87 for the ‘neutral civil’, 87 for the ‘obtrusive uncivil’, 89 for 
‘unobtrusive civil’, 89 for ‘unobtrusive uncivil’, and 88 for ‘neutral unobtrusive’. 
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b. Experimental Stimuli 
The stimuli for the six conditions were newspaper-like articles, featuring 
fictitious political characters (the same in every condition). In every treatment 
message, a fictitious opposition leader was presented as attacking the Government 
members’ positions on either tuition fees or agricultural subsidies. Manipulations 
varied in terms of the tone of criticism (i.e., civil versus uncivil) and its topic 
(i.e., obtrusive versus unobtrusive).8 We therefore systematically manipulated the 
topic and extent of civility, without altering the political content of the exchanges. 
We expected that when obtrusive topics were presented in an uncivil fashion, they 
would encourage more negative, distrustful attitudes toward politics and 
politicians.  
Consistent effort was put into ensuring that the reporting style of the 
experimental stimuli is as close as possible to the style routinely used in day-to-day 
political news in Romania. The stimuli were pretested on a sample of 36 students, 
and minimally adapted, based on some minor comments.  
 
c. Procedures 
The pre-test/post-test questionnaire and stimuli were pre-tested on a small sample 
of 36 students, who were not included in the final sample. The pre-test 
questionnaire included the measurements of the moderators considered for this 
study: political knowledge, introversion, and efficacy. The subjects first completed 
the pre-test part of the questionnaire, then read the ‘newspaper article’ containing 
one of the framing conditions, and then completed the post-test part of the 
questionnaire. The post-test questionnaire included the dependent variable, political 
trust, as well as other variables considered for further testing.  
Three scales were slightly adapted using classical wording to measure the 
moderators considered in this experiment: political knowledge, introversion and 
political efficacy. Another scale was used to measure political trust. We will 
further detail the final items included in each of the four scales.  
Political knowledge was measured using 7 multiple-choice questions testing 
for basic political information about the Romanian political life, from very simple 
questions, such as the name of the prime minister, to more complex ones, such as 
the procedure in case of a president’s death, etc. The answers were binary coded 
as dichotomous variables and the composite variable measuring the level of 
political knowledge resulted as the mean of the 0 or 1 point ‘obtained’ for each 
wrong or right answer, with ‘0’ representing the lack of political knowledge and ‘1’ 
a very strong political knowledge. The internal consistency of the scale 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .523) was considered high enough for a binary variables 
                                                 
8 The other two stimuli were neutrally framed, while there was no stimulus used for the seventh 
condition, the control group. 
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scale, even though below the .600 limit usually used for dichotomous variables 
scales (see Semetko and Valkenbourg, 2000).  
The level of introversion was measured using the classic Goldberg scale of 
10 items (4 coded in reverse order), measured on a 5-step Likert scale (Goldberg 
1999; Goldberg et al. 2006). Cronbach’s alpha of .842 argued for a reliable scale. 
For this scale, ‘1’ represents the introvert extreme of the scale and ‘5’ the extrovert 
extreme.  
Political efficacy was measured using 3 questions usually used to test for 
people’s opinions about how much they can influence politics in general. Subjects 
were asked to estimate (on a 7 point scale) how much they agree with the 
following statements: ‘People like me have no influence on the decisions 
politicians make’; ‘I don’t believe the government cares too much about what 
people like me care about’; ‘The government doesn’t give too much attention to 
problems people like me have’. The internal consistency of the scale was 
measured using Cronbach’s alpha (alpha = .761). The scale was adapted from 
classical scales used to measure political efficacy (Gerber et al. 2011; Gallego and 
Olberski 2011; Schuck and de Vreese 2011). For the efficacy scale, ‘1’ represents 
people’s trust that they can change or have an influence on or at least matter to 
the government, while ‘7’ stands for a general sense of powerlessness people 
associate with politicians and politics in general.  
The dependent variable, political trust, was measured using a 4-question scale, 
adapted from the scale used by Schuck and de Vreese (2012). Thus, the wording 
of the four questions, measured on a 7-point scale of level of agreement, were: 
‘Politicians generally have good intentions’; ‘When politicians make public 
statements, they are usually telling the truth’; ‘Most politicians can be trusted to do 
what is right’; ‘Despite what some people say, most politicians try to keep their 
promises, and work for the benefit of the people’, with ‘1’ meaning a lack of trust 
in politicians and politics in general and ‘7’ a high level of trust. Cronbach’s alpha 
(alpha = .817) showed an internally consistent scale.  
 
5. Results 
When testing the impact of conflict news frames on political trust, the first 
hypothesis was not validated. Differences between conflict frames vs. non-
conflict frames are not statistically significant (independent T tests not significant). 
However, when comparing means of political trust across experimental subgroups 
exposed to conflict news frames vs. non-conflict frames and no treatment, data 
show a trend of increasing/decreasing (variations in the level of) political trust. 
These levels are not statistically significant, but the consistency of the identified 
trends give us reasons to believe that, with a stronger stimulus, such a hypothesis 
could be validated. 
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Table 1. Variations of political trust among experimental subgroups 
  Mean N Std. deviation 
Control Group 2.31 89 0.94 
Non-conflict frame 2.38 173 0.95 
Conflict frame 2.26 349 0.99 
Total 2.30 611 0.97 
 
The hypothesis has been invalidated, but there is a consistent basis for 
arguing that frames revolving around conflict in political news lead to a decrease 
in political trust and vice-versa (H2). The level of political trust reported by the 
groups subjected to conflict news frames is smaller than the one reported by the 
control group which, in turn, is smaller than the political trust reported by the 
non-conflict frame group. In short, this proves that people subjected to non-
conflict news frames tend to report a higher level of political trust than those who 
are subjected to conflict frames.  
When comparing responses to the conflict portrayed in the news, clear 
differences can be observed in the ‘extreme’ treatment conditions (unobtrusive 
civil vs. intrusive uncivil conflicts). Exposure to these treatments shows 
a significant difference in levels of political trust (t[174] = -2.286, p<.01). The 
mean of the value of political trust in the uncivil intrusive treatment (M = 2.12, 
SD = .98) is significantly lower than the mean of the value of political trust in civil 
unobtrusive treatment (M = 2.47, SD = 1.02). 
Trying to explain such variations, we can argue that people exposed to 
a treatment of uncivil interaction about an obtrusive topic display a lower level of 
political trust than people exposed to a treatment of civil interaction about an 
unobtrusive topic. Therefore, we can clearly state that the nature of a political 
conflict covered in the media (civil or uncivil) has a more consistent impact on 
influencing political trust than the bare existence of a conflict. People seem to 
relate very differently to conflicts depending on their civility valence. Conflicts 
that are debated in a civil manner (regarding unobtrusive topics) elicit the public 
to score higher on the political trust scale. In contrast, uncivil conflicts (regarding 
obtrusive topics) make the public less trusting of politics in general.  
This finding casts a new light on the debate about the influence of conflict in 
the news in general. Our data suggests that it is not only the conflict that matters, 
but more specifically the type of conflict to which people are exposed that has 
a strong influence on their level of political trust. Without a doubt, political 
campaigns are dominated by conflicts, by their very nature as ‘horse races’, 
therefore political campaign staff and politicians should pay more attention to the 
tone of the conflicts and the topics around which they are built.  
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 Moving on to the third hypothesis (H3), we attempted to isolate the 
impact of personal characteristics on how people respond to media frames 
focused on conflicts; findings validated the existence of a mix of variables with 
potential impact on political trust. In order to understand the impact of our 
selected moderators on political trust we ran two regression models within each of 
the ‘extreme’ subgroups.  
 
Table 2. Regression model predicting political trust (unobtrusive civil conflict) 
 B Std. error Beta 
(Constant) 3.237* 1.433  
Political knowledge -.082 .785 -.016 
Efficacy -.456** .103 -.608 
Introvert Extrovert Scale .488* .270 .285 
Note: Dependent Variable = Political Trust 
 
The advanced model has enough explanatory power (Adjusted R square 
= .481) in order to argue for the choice of the most important moderators. A limit 
related to the homogeneity of the sample used prevented taking into 
consideration the socio-demographic characteristics. We acknowledge that, in 
further research, a good variability in the socio-demographic attributes of the 
subjects used in the experiment would allow for a more robust predictive model.  
Based on our data, we have identified two significant predictors of political 
trust: political efficacy and extroversion, the former being the strongest. The more 
politically efficient a person is, the more he/ she trusts the political scene, 
politicians and their decisions. In other words, the more people believe they 
matter to politicians and that their voice can be heard, the more they trust 
politicians and politics in general. Moreover, the more extroverted a person is, the 
more he/she shows political trust. (Table 2) 
 
Table 3. Regression model predicting political trust (obtrusive uncivil conflict) 
 B Std. error Beta 
(Constant) -.079 1.018  
Political knowledge 1.652* .606 .395 
Efficacy -.287** .092 -.453 
Introvert Extrovert Scale .765** .244 .455 
Note: Dependent Variable = Political Trust 
 
The second regression model identifies three significant predictors: efficacy, 
extroversion, and political knowledge (in this order). The strongest one is once 
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again political efficacy. The explanatory power of the model is high enough 
(Adjusted R square = .455) to argue for the choice of the most important 
moderators. This second model confirms the three moderators’ (political efficacy, 
introversion, and political knowledge) impact on political trust. We emphasize that 
the political knowledge only becomes a significant predictor for political trust for 
people exposed to an obtrusive, uncivil conflict frame.  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion  
Various studies have indicated that arguments and conflicts between politicians 
offer a distorted image of unreliable political institutions and political leaders, 
careless with public interest (Cappella and Jamieson 1997). As an extension of 
such studies, our research indicates that the way media frame political conflicts 
over contentious issues can have a serious negative impact on political trust, 
especially if the political discussions and debates lack civility and revolve around 
topics of personal relevance to the audience members. Even though our data are 
not robust enough to support with statistically significant results the impact that 
conflict framing (as opposed to non-conflict framing) has on political trust, we do 
have reasons to argue that future research should confirm the trends we have 
identified in the matter, namely that conflict frames undermine political trust in 
general.  
Moreover, our data add another nuance to the discussion related to the 
negative impact of political news frames: if the political debates over contentious 
topics of public interest are undertaken in a civilized manner, the effect of such 
news is not necessarily negative. If the audience members have a reasonable 
amount of political knowledge and also have confidence in their own ability to 
engage in politics and understand the political game (political efficacy), then they 
gain even more political trust when exposed to news about political disagreements 
and controversies. These findings indicate that when citizens have a knowledge 
base and are more trustful in their own capacity to influence the political game, 
conflicts among political leaders or parties do not demobilize them or make them 
less trustful towards politicians. A reasonable explanation is that such individuals 
understand that there is something at stake at the centre of a political conflict and 
that political debates are inherent to the political process. 
The effects that we could isolate in the experiment are somewhat surprising, 
if we think of the ephemeral nature of the stimuli (modified short newspaper 
articles) and, secondly, due to the stability of characteristics such as political trust, 
which does not traditionally have large fluctuations over time. Sudden changes 
occur only in exceptional circumstances, for example when a large-scale political 
scandal takes place. This study thus indicates a surprising malleability of political 
trust. If simply reading a piece of news can produce a change in terms of 
confidence in the political class, it is clear that this feature is much more volatile 
Madalina Botan, Nicoleta Corbu, Dani Sandu 
 
 
136 
than previously thought. However, this is also a limitation of this study: due to the 
weak stimuli (a piece of written news, allegedly one of the ‘news of the day’), we 
could not empirically support the impact of conflict framing on political trust in 
general. Nonetheless, we argue that the lack of statistical significance is most 
probably due to the stimuli, given the general direction of the effects that we 
tested. Moreover, real news and real political controversies – much more virulent 
and conflict loaded than the articles used as stimuli in this experiment – 
presumably have an even stronger impact on political trust. 
A limitation of the present study is related to the printed articles used in the 
experimental conditions. The hostility of a written text describing a political 
conflict is undoubtedly much reduced compared to a video message on the same 
topic. In a written text, nonverbal and paralinguistic cues, which normally amplify 
the conflict dimension of a described situation, disappear. A newspaper article 
cannot therefore trigger the same level of physiological attention as a TV message. 
The impact on the audience is thereby radically different. In such circumstances, 
the magnitude of the observed effects is all the more surprising. 
At the same time, we have to acknowledge another limitation of the study. 
This is due to the choice of subjects in the experiment. Even though many 
exploratory studies use students as participants in experiments, this choice always 
limits the results to young, educated people’s behaviour. At the same time, the 
homogeneity of the sample prevented controlling for other personal 
characteristics, such as age, education, income etc. These first results provide solid 
grounds for further research, using both stronger experimental treatments and 
a probabilistic sample of subjects, which will allow for a more thorough 
examination of the impact of types of conflict on political trust. Even though 
a moderation analysis in the classic sense of the term was not conducted, we 
believe political knowledge, political efficacy, and extroversion do moderate the 
level of political trust in conflict framed media news.  
The external validity of the experiment and the generalisation of results 
beyond the controlled universe of an academic experiment were also addressed. 
The fairly large number of participants (N = 617) allows us to extrapolate, to 
some extent, the results to the entire Romanian young population with higher 
education.  
Summing up, we believe that this study has made a modest but valuable 
contribution to answering a key question: ‘How do political conflicts portrayed in 
the news affect political trust?’ Our data show that the combined effect of conflict 
topic (obtrusive vs. unobtrusive) and style (civil vs. uncivil) has a considerable 
impact on political trust. There are many ways in which we can interpret such 
results and speculate about the consequences of political conflicts. What is certain 
is that a high level of political conflicts entails an increased level of mistrust in 
politicians and political institutions. 
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However, the present study adds a nuance to the discussion: Not every type 
of conflict has a negative impact, only the exposure to uncivil conflicts has a 
negative impact on political trust. In addition, such findings must be correlated 
with the individual characteristics of audience members. This research tested three 
variables that moderate the impact of news frames focused on political conflicts: 
a) political efficacy (confidence that citizens can have an influence on political 
decisions and that the government cares about the interests of ordinary people); 
b) political knowledge and c) extroversion. In the case of certain categories of 
citizens – people who have high political efficacy, are extroverted and more 
politically knowledgeable – uncivil conflicts do not have a negative effect on 
political trust. 
Returning to the main hypothesis of the research, we found that the way 
a political conflict is portrayed in the media makes a significant difference in terms 
of effects. The underlying assumption of this study confirmed by the empirical 
data suggests the existence of a cumulative effect of conflict-oriented news frames 
– a combined result of the topic and the civility of the conflicts portrayed in the 
news. Conflicts in the news may even have a positive effect on political trust if 
citizens understand what the conflicts are about, what it is at stake. An 
explanation of this phenomenon - already implied by other studies - relates to the 
fact that people who have knowledge of the debated topics are who are more 
extroverted and trust their ability to be part of the public debate ‘understand how 
and are willing to get involved in politics, without feeling intimidated by the 
challenges, conflicts or disagreements that may arise on the political scene’ 
(Valentino et al. 2011: 308). 
We believe that our study adds some useful insights into the process of 
moderated political trust, particularly since such studies still need to gain more 
popularity beyond the US and Anglophone countries.  
Last but not least, our research can also be viewed as radiography of the local 
journalistic practices which influence to a large extent they way people (who do 
not have direct contact with the political process) interpret the political world and 
make evaluative judgments. Building on this, we can argue that media, traditionally 
inclined to selectively frame extraordinary, dramatic and controversial issues, is 
not to be blamed for political mistrust and apathy. When investigating the causes 
of this so-called 'video-malaise', the personal characteristics of the public is 
a much more fertile direction of research. The inclusion of personality traits, such 
as extroversion, also represents a step forward in understanding how political 
information is consumed and used when making political evaluations.  
In conclusion, sentiments towards political leaders are increasingly influenced 
by the media coverage of politics. In Romania, there is a strong bias towards 
negativity in the media. However, the fact that citizens are disheartened and feel 
that the domestic conflict between politicians is overshadowing actual 
policymaking in the country is not only a consequence of the biased media 
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portrayals of political leaders but it is due to a larger extent on the lack of a strong 
knowledge base and efficacy related to the political process. Healthy democracies 
rely on such characteristics; they allow citizens to be an active part in the political 
game. We will not, therefore, join the choir of media critics, who deplore 
contemporary journalistic practices and see in them the source of all public 
'malaise', but argue instead for the necessity to consolidate the democratic 
processes in the emergent democracies and test new variables in order to see how 
the academic community can contribute to this process.  
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